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Book Reviews
Strategic Studies
Clausewitz Goes Global: Carl von Clausewitz in the 21st
Century
Edited by Reiner Pommerin
Reviewed by Dr. Hugh Smith, former associate professor, University of New
South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and author of On
Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas (Macmillan, 2005)

T

he Clausewitz Society was founded in Germany in 1961 to promote
the study of Clausewitz’s ideas particularly as they relate to current
strategic and political issues. This book, first published in hardback in
2011, was commissioned to celebrate the Society’s 50th year. Civilian and
military scholars from 18 countries – 13 in Europe plus China, Israel, Japan,
South Africa and the United States of America (the United Kingdom and
Russia are notable omissions) – were asked to examine how Clausewitz’s
understanding of war has been interpreted in their country and whether
his thinking still plays any role in military and political affairs. The book’s
title suggests Clausewitz, like trade and communications, has become
globalized. However, the book’s contents indicate for the last 180 years
Clausewitz has attracted relatively limited interest in most countries, is
often misunderstood or misrepresented, and rarely influences strategy or
policy in any identifiable fashion.
It is not clear whether contributors were asked to write to a format
but certain common themes are apparent. Some authors are able to
refer to Clausewitz’s visits to their country, for example, Belgium and
Switzerland, with the latter claiming that Madame de Staël and August
von Schlegel re-invigorated his nationalism and romanticism during
his rather comfortable time as a prisoner in Castle Coppet on Lake
Geneva during the French occupation. The Spanish contributor argues
Clausewitz’s understanding of guerrilla war would have benefited from
military service in the peninsula.
More substantially, most contributors struggle to find significant
and sustained intellectual efforts in their country to come to grips with
Clausewitz. On War might be translated into the relevant language, sometimes at an early date, but this does not ensure continuing an informed
interest in its content. Germany and France are significant exceptions.
Even so, much has depended on the work of preeminent individuals,
notably Werner Hahlweg and Raymond Aron who receive due attention
from Claus von Rosen and Uwe Hartmann, and from Hervé CoutauBégarie respectively. Yet the salience of individual writers, it is apparent,
can also wreak havoc with Clausewitz’s reputation – think of Liddell
Hart’s “Mahdi of mass” in Britain or René Girard’s apocalyptic interpretation in France.
Similar considerations apply to efforts to incorporate Clausewitz
into the syllabus of military colleges or officer education. One or two
enlightened educators introduce ideas – often competing with advocates
of Jomini or Sun Tsu – but sooner or later, their influence wanes. Often
officers are assigned to “teach Clausewitz” in military colleges, but do
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not have time to get beyond relating his ideas to supposedly more relevant factors such as centers of gravity, the superiority of the defense or
the culminating point of the offensive. At the same time, few contributors are able to refer to any substantial study of Clausewitz in civilian
universities – for obvious reasons. We learn even the study of military
history was actively discouraged in Austrian and Japanese universities
after 1945.
Several papers attempt to find Clausewitz relevant (or not relevant)
to their nation’s experience of conflict – whether national liberation,
guerrilla war, Cold War, or post-Cold War conflicts. In most cases the
argument is tenuous. Some contributors acknowledge how difficult it is
to explain how such influence might occur, or to produce evidence of
Clausewitz’s impact on policy or the conduct of war. The problem of influence is all the greater when there is misunderstanding of Clausewitzian
thinking or a selective quotation is used to provide spurious authority
for an argument. In public debates it is common for “Clausewitzian” to
become either a term of approbation or of abhorrence.
One paper stands out from the rest, by Christopher Bassford on
“Clausewitz in America today.” True, he has the advantage of reporting
on a country that has a strong and extensive intellectual engagement
with Clausewitz, at least since the US defeat in Vietnam and the appearance of the Howard-Paret translation of On War in 1976. But he is acutely
aware of the methodological problems in demonstrating Clausewitz’s
influence (hence the sub-title of his 1994 book, Clausewitz in English,
refers to “reception” rather than “influence”), while he is entertainingly
trenchant in his analysis of US writers on Clausewitz and forthright in
his conclusion – “American military and governmental students get very
little out of reading Clausewitz” (349). The volume is worth taking off
the library shelf for this contribution alone.

Creative Strategy: A Guide for Innovation
By William Duggan
Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, Colonel, USA Retired, Professor, Leadership and
Cultural Studies, US Army War College

W
New York: Columbia
Business School Publishing,
2012
165 pages
$27.95

ithin the past decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) and
its armed services have issued a call for agile leaders and adaptive
organizations while stressing the need for creativity and innovation to
sustain US strategic advantages. Many national security professionals will
agree with the needs but our military seems continually challenged by
creating an effective “how to” that can provide national security advantages. Dr. William Duggan in his latest work, Creative Strategy: A Guide for
Innovation, provides insights and a framework that may be useful within
DOD. He examines two traditional methods claiming to yield creative
ideas for strategy: methods of creativity (developing ideas) and methods
of strategy (analyze strategic situations).
Dr. Duggan is the author of three previous books on the topic of
strategic intuition, which describe the process of organizational innovation: Napoleon’s Glance: The Secret of Strateg y (2002); The Art of What Works:
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How Success Really Happens (2003); and Strategic Intuition: The Creative Spark
in Human Achievement (2007), which the journal Strateg y+Business named
“Best Strategy Book of the Year.”
While he is a senior lecturer at Columbia Business School (Columbia
University is the source of his BA, MA, and PhD), Dr. Duggan is no
stranger to the US military. He is a recurring guest lecturer at the
Creative and Strategic Leadership electives at the US Army War College,
has written a Strategic Studies Institute monograph, Coup d’Oeil: Strategic
Intuition in Army Planning, and worked with Army Research Institute for
the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Much of what Duggan writes is a
direct application of the theory and approach he espouses. He does a
deep dive to find historical cases, extracts examples of solutions to pieces
of the problem, and then combines them in flashes of insight as innovations addressing the initial or emergent concern.
Accordingly, Duggan takes an individual level phenomenon of what
some call creative genius and develops the construct of strategic intuition. For the individual using strategic intuition, “the brain selects a set
of elements from memory, combines them in a new way, and projects
that new combination into the future as a course of action to follow.”
Duggan then provides an organizational-level technique to solve strategic issues. Importantly, an organization’s leaders struggle with strategic
questions such as determining “what course of action your company
should pursue in the future . . . , where no one person has enough direct
experience to give a good answer solely from that source.” Rather than
rely on the lone creative individual to divine the great idea, Duggan
employs techniques from big corporations such as General Electric to
engage multiple elements of the organization to attack its strategic issues.
Extending his assessment of how individuals think and innovate,
Duggan presents a framework for creative strategy “where you apply
strategic intuition in a systemic way to find a creative solution to a strategic problem.” That framework consists of three phases: rapid appraisal,
“what-works scan,” and a creative combination that requires analysis
of the problem space and environment, searches for existing solutions
from similar problems, and cobbles together elements for an effective
and novel resolution.
Readers may claim that this is nothing really new in the area of
strategy development. Duggan might agree saying “Ah. Yes, but...”
In the second part of the book, he provides a short précis of existing
techniques for creativity and innovation and strategy—with a list of the
usual suspects. As a counter to readers’ concerns, he offers an assessment of existing “best practices” to identify shortfalls. While he may
seem overly dismissive of widely accepted theories and models that have
become sacred cows, Duggan asks readers to understand the organizational context and apply elements of “best practices” as appropriate to
the strategic problem at hand.
As the subtitle reads, “A Guide for Innovation,” this book is an
easy read and very formulaic in demonstrating how to use Duggan’s
creative strategy framework. His use of real-world business examples
illustrates the application of the framework under conditions of success
and failure. Readers may be understandably put off by his claim all other
approaches are deficient. Such is the nature of this type of book.
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Military readers may draw parallels to the recent design methodology
from Army and Joint doctrine as applied to operational art—frame the
environment, redefine the problem, and develop operational approaches
to resolve the problem. Military readers may also tend to dismiss this
book as a business-centered approach and not appropriate for issues
of national defense. For this reviewer, creative strategy is bigger than
design and it can be applied to organizational and institutional issues. As
DOD wrestles with new policy and strategic guidance, downsizing and
restructuring the force, and the need to develop effective structures to
provide national security, I can see no greater opportunity to give this
Duggan’s framework a chance.
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Afghanistan
102 Days of War: How Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda & the
Taliban Survived 2001
By Yaniv Barzilai
Reviewed by Ronald E. Neumann, former US ambassador to Algeria, Bahrain,
and Afghanistan (2005-07) and a former deputy assistant Secretary of State for
the Middle East.

Y

aniv Barzilai’s 102 Days of War is a serious and eminently readable
account of the beginning of America’s Afghan war. Barzilai raises
fundamental issues beyond the history he chronicles, such as the relative
roles of force protection versus mission accomplishment, and the correct
role of the president in goal setting; themes that constantly reemerge in
national security decision making.
Barzilai contends the force-protection demand for a northern base
for combat search and rescue was delayed and put at risk from the beginning of the northern Afghanistan campaign. Casualty minimization may
also have been a factor in General Franks’ refusal to devote more US
forces to the Tora Bora battle. How much risk for what purpose needs
to be considered at the most senior levels. Since Benghazi, nervous
Washington leaders have tilted the balance so far towards protection
that America’s diplomats are seriously impeded in getting out among the
population to report and recommend policy approaches. With further
withdrawals from Afghanistan, the force-protection issue will reemerge
in a military context. How much of the remaining force will be devoted
to protecting itself? Will that leave enough for mission accomplishment?
The answers are uncertain but 102 Days of War reminds us consequences
will be born at the highest political level.
Barzilai’s major focus throughout the book is the contention
President George W. Bush failed to define the priority of destroying al
Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden. Lack of clarity confused operational planning resulting in failure to destroy the majority of al Qaeda
leadership at Tora Bora. This theme is unfolded in detailed examinations of key decisions in Washington and in the field. Documents were
supplemented for interviews with major decision makers.
Within this theme are two parts; one is the absence of sufficiently
clear objectives, the second is the belief President Bush should have
taken a far more hands-on approach at critical moments. Each is well
supported but counterpoints can be raised in both cases.
First, that the absolute destruction of al Qaeda was not adequately
designated as a top priority is clearly documented. Yet there is room
for discussion. Bush is quoted at one point as telling his cabinet the
destruction of al Qaeda and the Taliban were of equal importance (34)
and, at another, he wanted Osama bin Laden “alive or dead” (27). Was
this not kept clear as discussion moved forward? Is the problem with
cabinet officials and commanding generals not paying due attention
to the President’s guidance? One senior diplomat told me he believed
both to be the case. My own policy experience is senior meetings rarely
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have the clarity suggested by study after the fact and finding the right
balance in strategic guidance between too much and too little detail
is difficult. Mission statements are tricky enough to frame in military
staffs where the concept is both accepted and trained. It is much harder
among civilian decision makers who lack this background. Getting the
right strategic guidance is difficult, which is why the book’s discussion
is so worthwhile.
The second sub-theme is Bush delegated too broadly and should
have taken a more direct role in supervising major decision points, especially the battle of Tora Bora. Contrast is made with President Obama’s
detailed oversight of the Abbottabad raid that killed bin Laden. Perhaps
this is true, but the issue is more complicated than Barzilai suggests.
There is no reminder of the micro-management of President Johnson
during the Vietnam war. Yet that history is a formative part of how
modern American civilian and military leaders look at the proper
wartime role of the president. Reference is made to the role of other
wartime leaders including President Lincoln. But Lincoln intervened
to change commanders, not to manage battles nor to dictate campaign
details.
The Abbottabad raid is completely different in scale from a large
battle, as well as in the time to prepare which Barzilai does recognize.
When the Obama administration applied the same micro-management
to other decisions, such as the months spent deciding 2015 troop levels
in Afghanistan, the results were political confusion in Afghanistan and
NATO, which thwarted military planning. These reservations do not
make Barzilai wrong. Rather, they point to the difficulty of getting
the balance right in applying—in practice—the principles of strategic
leadership.
102 Days of War is both elegant and detailed in examining these and
many other aspects of a crucial historical period. It raises large issues
that will concern us again and again in future crises.

The Tender Soldier: A True Story of War and Sacrifice
By Vanessa M. Gezari
Reviewed by Janeen Klinger, Department of National Security and Strategy, US
Army War College
New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2013
327 pages
$25.00

T

he tone and style of The Tender Soldier is vaguely reminiscent of Greg
Mortenson’s book, Three Cups of Tea, although the subject matter
is quite different. Still, this book provides an introduction into counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan suitable for the general reader. The
book touches several subjects that will be familiar to a military audience: the debate over the role of technology, and the creation of the
new counter-insurgency manual, FM 3-24. By far, the book’s strongest
element lies in its description of the evolution and problems associated
with Human Terrain Teams (HTT). The HTT program was an effort
to use social science knowledge directly on the battlefield by deploying
social scientists with troops. Although military professionals may well be
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aware of the program, the fact the story is told from an outside perspective means the book will be of interest to them.
The tender soldier of the book’s title is Paula Loyd, one member of a
human terrain team that was deployed to Afghanistan 2008, and whom
the author says was one of the best qualified social scientists working
on such a team. The book’s opening chapter describes an attack on
Loyd—she is doused with fuel and set on fire; her teammate, Don Ayala,
apprehends and shoots the assailant while the latter is handcuffed. The
story of Loyd and Ayala is interwoven into a discussion of the evolution of the program and an analysis of the problems associated with it.
Because of this interweaving, the narrative is a little disjointed but the
insights into the program and its flaws are well worth the journey.
Problems with the HTT begin with the nature of the training the
teams received. According to Gezari, all team members she interviewed
described the training as “disappointing.” Although the ostensible
purpose of the HTT was to provide cultural awareness to soldiers in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the author encountered some members with no such
expertise and she suggested recruitment into the program was deeply
flawed. She noted practitioners such as Paula Loyd, who are former soldiers with extensive experience in non-governmental organizations and
time on the ground in Afghanistan, were quite rare. Interviews with key
individuals involved with the program (Steve Fondacaro, a retired US
Army colonel; Montgomery McFate, an anthropologist) attribute flaws
in recruitment to an overly generous contract with BAI Systems, which
was responsible for supplying recruits. In addition, both Fondacaro and
McFate believe the program was expanded too rapidly. Fondacaro is
quoted as saying the program thought it had two years to build five
teams but were, in fact, required to field 26 teams immediately. McFate
describes the rapid expansion of the program as “catastrophic.”
Once the HTT were deployed the problems were compounded
by the ambiguity of their purpose. Some thought they were part of a
humanitarian aid mission while others thought they were to explain to
commanders why local people supported the insurgency. Gezari quoted
one USMC colonel in Helmand Province saying he did not know what
the team he was supervising was supposed to do−and neither did anyone
else. Consequently, the team was left to “figuring it out as they went
along.” The description of dysfunction in the HTT program suggests
the execution left much to be desired.
Two broader lessons emerge from reading The Tender Soldier. The first
involves the rather short-term memory that plagues the military and
other policy-makers. The military had tried to use social scientists in an
operational way in the 1960s, and Gezari outlines the details of Project
Camelot, which also showed dismal results. Moreover, not only were
nation-building efforts in Vietnam a failure despite the input of social
scientists, the United States had also tried to replicate the success of the
Tennessee Valley Authority in Afghanistan in 1960 with the creation
of Helmand Valley Authority. Arnold Toynbee toured the project at
Lashkar Gah and reported it “has become a piece of America inserted
into the Afghan landscape. . .the new world they are conjuring up out of
the desert at the Helmand River’s expense is to be an America−in Asia.”
That project too hit the limits of culture and history.
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The second lesson involves the fundamental ambiguity so characteristic of counter-insurgency. When Gezari returned to Kandahar to
learn what she could about Paula Loyd’s killer, she encountered contradictory stories about the man’s motive, with some locals asserting he had
been kidnapped by the Taliban and forced to do its bidding and others
claiming he was mentally ill. The truth regarding his motive may never
be ascertained, which stands as an appropriate symbol for the difficulty
inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns.
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Regional Policy & Security
US Taiwan Strait Policy: The Origins of Strategic Ambiguity
By Dean P. Chen
Reviewed by Richard Halloran, former foreign correspondent in Asia and
military correspondent in Washington for The New York Times

F

or six decades, American policy toward China has been shaped
by a theme called “strategic ambiguity.” The summit meeting in
June between President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China in
California suggested “strategic ambiguity” has run its course, and should
be retired in favor of “strategic clarity, tactical ambiguity.”
This book by Dean Chen, a political scientist at the University of
California, Santa Barbara, traces the evolution of “strategic ambiguity”
in meticulous detail from its earliest days (before the Communist Party
came to power in mainland China) to the present. The author has relied
on an extensive reading of declassified files to make his case and, in so
doing, shows how Washington works. In particular, he weaves a narrative of memos, position papers, directives, meetings, public speeches,
and press conferences to explain how a policy is shaped.
Chen is less persuasive, however, in arguing for the continuation
of strategic ambiguity. With democracy evidently having taken hold in
Taiwan, Chen asserts: “Beijing should come to terms with that reality
and learn to show greater respect to voices and political views that are
contradictory to its own.” Given that Beijing has insisted the world
accept its position on a wide range of issues, Chen’s plea is roughly akin
to asking water to flow uphill.
After the Communists led by Mao Zedong took over Beijing in
October 1949, President Truman and his administration struggled with
a dilemma. Clearly, they did not want the United States to get into a
war with the new Chinese regime. On the other hand, they did not
want to see the island of Taiwan, also known by its Portuguese name,
Formosa, fall under mainland control after the Nationalist Chinese had
taken refuge there.
Thus, in January, 1950, President Truman issued a statement: “The
United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to
involvement in the civil conflict in China.” But the president and his advisors did not say what the United States would do to implement their policy.
Then in June, 1950, that ambiguity was hardened when North Korea
attacked South Korea beginning the Korean War. President Truman,
fearing Beijing would launch a parallel attack on Taiwan, announced: “I
have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.” The
president also called on the Nationalist Chinese to cease military operations against the mainland, further announcing: “The Seventh Fleet will
see that this is done.”
In succeeding decades, strategic ambiguity became the watchword
for dealing with China. During the war in Vietnam, the shift in diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, and the emergence
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of China as a regional economic, political, and military power, it was
the default position. The basic intent was to keep the Chinese guessing
about what the United States would do.
Over those same years, however, Chinese leaders have become more
firm as they identified what they call their core interests and at times
more aggressive, even belligerent. In the California summit, contrast
the tone as explained by Yang Jiechi, a senior party official and former
foreign minister, and Tom Donilon, a senior staffer for the National
Security Council. They briefed the press separately after the summit
meeting in an estate on the edge of a desert town named, perhaps appropriately, Rancho Mirage.
Yang was clear in stating the Chinese positions. These included
Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and large portions of the South
China Sea and an adamant denial China was responsible for hacking into
US cyber transmissions. In addition, he said President Xi had called for
Sino-American coordination on hotspots such as the Korean Peninsula
and Afghanistan and on peacekeeping and cyber security. Lastly, the
Chinese proposed fostering new Sino-American military relations.
Donilon, however, indicated President Obama did not respond to
those proposals. Instead, Donilon dwelled on the eight hours of conversation and the meeting’s atmospherics. Among the few substantive
points: Donilon said President Obama had warned President Xi that
continued Chinese hacking into US cyber systems would have adverse
consequences. But the president’s stance on China came off as soft,
vague, and perhaps even indecisive—much like the policies of several
previous administrations whether Democratic or Republican. Overall,
the absence of clear-cut US objectives may have made the chances of a
strategic miscalculation more likely.
How much better it would be if America’s China policy were based
on “strategic clarity,” in which the fundamental national interests of the
United States were publicized for all to see. The corollary would be tactical ambiguity, in which the time and place and means of defending those
interests would be kept out of the public eye. That ambiguity would be
intended to keep a potential adversary off balance and would, therefore,
be a critical component of deterrence.
Despite Chen’s appeal for strategic ambiguity to continue, his exposition of the historical background makes an excellent contribution to the
running debate that erupts from time to time on what American policy
on China should be. His book, however, has one editorial flaw, which
is the unfortunate academic habit of referring to scholars, researchers,
officials, and even political leaders without identifying them. In a critical
passage, the author refers to Jack Snyder, Aaron Friedberg, Lee Tenghui, and Chen Shui-bian without telling the reader who they are. Many
readers will know—but many others will not.
As the famously demanding editor of the New Yorker, Harold Ross,
might have written in the margin next to each name: “Who he?”

Book Reviews: Regional Policy & Security

147

Cuba in a Global Context: International Relations,
Internationalism, and Transnationalism
Edited by Catherine Krull
Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz

I

t is not an exaggeration to say no other country in the world has
attracted the attention of the United States more than the island
of Cuba. Extremes of friendliness and animosity have characterized
US-Cuba diplomatic relations since 7 January 1959, when the United
States recognized the new Cuban government but maintained serious
reservations about its leader, Fidel Castro. With the end of the Cold War
and the radical transformation of the bipolar world into a unipolar one
dominated by the United States, Cuba now stands at a crossroad. As
the world becomes more “flat,” to use Thomas Friedman’s description,
Cuba will have to reorient its foreign policy during its “special period in
time of peace,” and find its own niche during this process of globalization and regionalization (3). Furthermore, domestic imperatives, diverse
constituencies, and US-Cuban perceptions and misperceptions will also
impact Washington’s policy toward Cuba.
In this edited anthology, Catherine Krull takes a fresh look at Cuba’s
international relations in its attempt to survive its contentious relations
with the United States and to build new bridges in the post-Cold War
world. The political constructs of international relations—where Cubans
found themselves at the center of the long geopolitical struggle between
the United States and the Soviet Union—are fundamental to Cuba’s
future. But so are internationalism (the promotion of increased economic and political cooperation amongst nations) and transnationalism
(people-to-people rather than government-to-government relationships). Cuba, according to Krull, has been active in the international
system in the aftermath of the implosion of the Soviet Union. Cuba, once
described as “Moscow’s favorite Marxist-Leninist showcase in the developing world—the only socialist revolution that had succeeded in Latin
America,”1 was taken by surprised once President Mikhail Gorbachev
came to power in 1985, and introduced two new concepts into the political vocabulary of the Soviet Union: glasnost and perestroika. Perestroika
was an attempt to restructure the Soviet Union’s economy, which was
at the edge of collapse; while glasnost was the political opening of the
Soviet Union’s authoritarian regime. Within a year, the Soviet Union
under Gorbachev collapsed and its satellite states, including Cuba,
lost their geopolitical value to the newly created Russian Republic. As
Krull points out, “within a year Cuba’s massively important special
conditions as a member of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) and the international socialist division of labor were a
thing of the past, and the island was soon to reel under the impact of an
80 percent drop in its purchasing power abroad and the almost total loss
of its Soviet and Eastern European markets and suppliers” (51).
Recognizing the end of the Cold War and the new international political environment of the twenty-first century, Cuba’s revolutionary project
would have to find new allies. The decade of the 1980s, the so-called “lost
decade” in Latin America, was a period of economic hardship followed
1      Lock K. Johnson National Security Intelligence: Secret Operations in Defense of the Democracies,
Malden, MA. (2012):48.

Savannah, GA: Relations
and Comparative Politics
at Armstrong State
University, 2013
352 pages
$74.95

José de Arimatéia da
Cruz Visiting Research
Professor at the US
Army War College
and Professor of
International Relations
and Comparative Politics
at Armstrong State
University, Savannah,
Georgia

148

Parameters 44(3) Autumn 2014

by high unemployment, capital flight, and economic crisis. Proponents of
globalization, Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher
in the United Kingdom, promised rapid economic growth and prosperity.
Instead, the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 did more damage to an
already frail and weak political system. As Krull points out, “damaging
commodity prices, scarce line of credit, declining foreign investment, and
a depressed export-import market are particularly taxing for developing
countries,” including Cuba (134).
It was within this chaotic political environment that Cuba found new
allies. All of them political allies who came to power with the rise of the “pink
tide,” which brought to power political leaders not only of the radical left
but also antagonists toward the United States and its foreign policy toward
Latin America (Evo Morales in Bolivia, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina,
Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Luis Inacio “Lula”
da Silva in Brazil). In 2005, at the Fourth Summit of the Americas held in
Mar del Plata, Argentina, members of the “pink tide” including the founding
members of the MERCOSUR (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay)
closed ranks with Venezuela to oppose the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) which was endorsed by the Bush administration (133). Cuba and
its radical allies are also using their “soft power” to entice an enlargement
of the “pink tide” membership. Joseph Nye, Jr., in his book Soft Power: The
Means to Success in World Politics (2004) defines soft power as “the ability to
get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It
arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” (x) Cuba and Venezuela are spreading their “soft power” through the
establishment of Telesur, “the hemisphere-wide, noncommercial television
network set up by Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina, and Uruguay in 2005, which
broadcasts anti-US hegemony programming” (131).
In addition to the radical left in Latin America, Cuba has also entered
into bilateral agreements with China and Canada to enhance its “revolution.” According to Krull, in the relatively short period of twenty years
since the end of the Cold War, China has become one of Cuba’s main
strategic allies. In 1990, Cuba was China’s largest Latin American trading
partner. China’s economic penetration of Cuba is astonishing and should
be of concern to Washington. China has, in essence, replaced the Soviet
Union as Cuba’s banker. Cuba and China became important markets for
each other’s products. According to Carlos Alzugaray Treto, in his essay
Cuban-Chinese Relations after the End of the Cold War, “trade became relatively
complementary, with China importing raw sugar and nickel from Cuba,
and exporting machinery, dry beans, transport equipment, and light
industrial products in return. China reported bilateral trade figure of $2.29
billion in 2007, $2.27 billion in 2008, $1.55 billion in 2009, and rising to
$2.43 billion in 2012” (97). For its part, Canada recognized the revolutionary government of Fidel Castro only eight months after its overthrow of
the Fulgencio Batista government. Canada’s foreign policy of “constructive engagement” or “principled pragmatism” is a striking contrast with
the US Government’s policy of isolating Cuba (115).
I recommend this book to anyone interested in history, politics and
international relations. This text can be especially useful to students at
the US Army War College and military leaders who may be called upon
to engage in a “constructive engagement” with Cuba in the decades to
come as the island goes through another “special period.”
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Security & Defense
Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know
by P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman
Reviewed by Major Nathan K. Finney, a US Army strategist currently working
on the Army Staff.

C

yber is one of the fastest growing aspects of the military today;
while most functions of the military are sustaining severe cuts
to funding, those associated with cyber are among the few likely
to see an increase in the near future. Despite its apparent importance,
even leading to the creation of a sub-unified command with attendant
service component commands, few military officers outside those tasked
to support United States Cyber Command understand the subject, even
with the publishing of frequent articles in professional journals, such
as the recent article by Paul Rexton Kan in the Autumn 2013 issue of
Parameters.
Fortunately, in Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know,
Singer and Friedman provide an easily accessible primer. This book was
designed to take complicated material and make it understandable to
non-technicians and non-academics. The beauty is it does so without
stripping the topic of meaning and nuance. Fellows at the Brookings
Institution, Singer and Friedman skillfully pooled their resources as
experts on defense and technology affairs to create an extremely useful
reference for laymen and defense professionals alike.
Written in a question-and-answer format, each section is easily
digested and retained, as well as referenced later. Questions are broken
into three parts: historical/technical aspects of cyber, structural and
operational implications, and what we can do about it. The first section
is valuable to those who have not studied the history or technical aspects
of cyber; the final section provides some interesting policy proposals
and personal tips to secure cyberspace. However, the middle section
really provides intellectual meat for military professionals.
While discussing why cyber matters in this section, the authors
spend a significant amount of time on cyber security from a military
perspective. I was pleased to see a robust yet concise discussion on the
finer points of cyber security, including the authors’ obvious intellectual
grounding in the general theory of war and the intricacies of strategy. In
particular, the part that most piqued my interest was the discussion on
the perceived advantage of either the offense or defense in cyber action.
Singer and Friedman do a wonderful job framing the current infatuation
with cyber attack as the stronger form of cyber action, drawing parallels
with a similar doctrine permeating Europe in the early 20th Century.
This so called “cult of the offensive” had logical groundings in military
thought prior to World War I, but was subsequently proven tragically
wrong in the Great War. One wonders if the same rings true in cyber
space, or if this new medium truly favors the offense over the defense.
Singer and Friedman do an admirable job describing the issue at hand
and its inconclusive nature to date.

Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014
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Though brief, readers can expect Cybersecurity and Cyberwar’s explanations, stories, and analysis to provide significant benefit to their
intellectual foundations. This book should be a first stop for military
professionals interested in cyber security.

Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force
By Robert M. Farley
Reviewed by Ryan D. Wadle, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the
Air Command and Staff College

R
Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 2014.
244 pages
$26.95

obert Farley’s Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air
Force offers a bold, provocative thesis: the Air Force as a separate
entity should be eliminated with its assets and missions distributed
between the Army and Navy. Farley argues the Air Force’s independence
has always rested solely on its ability to carry out strategic attack missions.
Early airpower theorists such as Brigadier General William Mitchell linked
the independent air service with strategic bombing theoretically capable
of defeating enemies quicker and cheaper than traditional ground and
naval campaigns, and this core belief continues to drive the modern
Air Force. Farley argues this optimistic view of airpower’s potential
violates Clausewitz’s theories on the nature of war and has never been
borne out through a century of combat experience. America’s political
leaders and decision makers continue to give the Air Force a privileged
position because they are seduced by airpower’s assurances of efficient,
almost bloodless war; but the Air Force is incapable of delivering on its
promises. Since the Air Force is presently attempting to apply its own
skewed, paranoid worldview to cyberspace, seemingly unable to perform
its nuclear deterrent mission, and is under cultural assault by the promise
of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), Farley reasons the Air Force should
be abolished.
Farley’s fundamental point about the need for defense reorganization in the wake of both the Cold War and the post-9/11 interventions
is a sound one. He also identifies failings of the Air Force as a fascination with technology and frequent conflation of targeting and strategy.
The author’s critique of the Air Force’s Manichean cyberspace policies
and its contrasts with the Navy’s view of cyberspace as a virtual global
commons is easily the highlight of Grounded. Yet, while lay readers may
be entranced with Farley’s argument and see a viable path for defense
reform, informed readers will find a book heavily reliant on secondary
sources with oversights, conceptual flaws, and factual errors that completely undermine the book’s core thesis.
By focusing so much on the Air Force’s organizational behavior and
its policymaking consequences, Farley gives short shrift to the strategic
context of decision making. Unlike many defense reorganization plans,
Farley specifies neither the threat he envisions the United States and its
allies will face in the coming decades nor how abolishing the Air Force
will help the nation overcome those challenges. There is a similar absence
of strategic context in the historical examples cited as evidence. It was
not by accident the two dominant sea powers of the last two centuries
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– the United States and Great Britain – pursued strategic bombing and
robust, independent air forces while most other great power nations did
not. This fact completely escapes Farley’s attention even though it helps
explain much of the cultural mindset undergirding strategic airpower.
Similarly, he uses the organizational structures of airpower in the Soviet
Union, Canada, and Israel as potential models for reform in the United
States; yet never accounts for the vastly different security needs and
priorities of these nations. Without knowing Farley’s vision of the world
and the United States’ role in it, it becomes extremely difficult to assess
the validity of his ideas.
Farley believes abolishing the Air Force will solve many problems
confronting the defense establishment, but he paints this choice as
having few, if any long term costs. Eliminating the Air Force may reduce
inter-service friction in some arenas and facilitate better air-to-ground
and air-to-sea coordination as the author argues, but the checkered
history of “jointness” both before and after Goldwater-Nichols suggests
this will not be a cure-all. Farley also never spells out the fates of several
critical Air Force missions and leaves vital questions unanswered. Is the
Army or Navy likely to be as interested in the strategic airlift mission
as the current Air Force? These sorts of trade-offs never factor into his
analysis. Even though Farley contributes to Information Dissemination, a
naval affairs blog that takes a refreshingly broad view of the value of
seapower, his opinion of the Air Force is too often reductive and lacks
nuance.
Most importantly, Grounded presents a simplistic, distorted historical
narrative that tars the modern Air Force with decades-old combat failures and overpromises of efficiency and precision. Of course, sending
unescorted bombers over German skies in 1943 to destroy ball-bearing
factories was the pinnacle of folly, highlighting deep organizational and
cultural flaws in the Army Air Force; but Farley curiously ignores the
much more effective bombing raids of 1944 and 1945, which successfully
struck the Nazi fuel and transportation systems and helped neutralize
Germany’s war machine. Few people should take statements of airpower
supremacy following World War II and DESERT STORM seriously,
just as they must also force policymakers to account for their expectation
of precise, cheap, and ethically “clean” airpower campaigns over strategic choices. Most major airpower theorists and analysts writing today
strongly insist airpower is only effective when employed with strategic
clarity and purpose, and in concert with other military and non-military
levers of power.
There is an argument to be made for defense reorganization in
which the Air Force ceases to exist as an independent service, and,
to his credit, Farley identifies some of what ails the Air Force and the
long-term challenges the service must confront to maintain relevance.
Grounded, however, is too flawed to make an effective case for abolishing
the Air Force.
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The Invisible Soldiers: How America Outsourced Our Security
By Ann Hagedorn
Reviewed by Steven L. Schooner, Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government
Procurement Law, George Washington University Law School (US Army,
retired).

New York, Simon &
Schuster, 2014
320 pages
$28.00 (hardback)

M

ilitary historians may someday conclude that, despite the emergence of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or drone) as a modern
marvel of information collection, targeting, and weapons delivery, this
generation’s most significant battlefield evolution involved people. Never
before has a nation’s military enjoyed the capacity, facilitated by the
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), to deploy an unlimited number of warfighters swiftly, without geographical limitation, and
indefinitely sustain that fighting force with an unprecedented level of
readiness. Such surge capacity and flexibility come at a steep price, both
fiscal and moral, which will be debated for many years to come.
But for all the controversy generated by the government’s pervasive
outsourcing of battlefield support, it is the post-millennial proliferation
of arms-bearing contractors that roiled the human rights community and
catalyzed a global conversation about the nature and future of modern
warfare. This new breed of weapon-toting contractors – serving as
guards, escorts, police, advisors, and trainers, but cumulatively perceived
in the contingency area as soldier-like, and called everything from private
military and privatized security to mercenaries—draws Ann Hagedorn’s
ire and anxiety. And she is not alone.
Peter W. Singer’s now familiar Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the
Privatized Military Industry, introduced professional readers to the
increasingly sophisticated arms-bearing contractor industry and the
accelerating trend of state reliance on these firms. Others, including,
but by no means limited to, Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The
Consequences of Privatizing Security, James Jay Carafano, Private Sector, Public
Wars: Contractors in Combat - Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts, David
Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq, Allison Stanger,
One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future
of Foreign Policy, and Laura Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace: Preserving
Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs, further illuminated
a shadowy, seemingly unregulated, globalized, and disaggregated
population of former soldiers, shrewd businessmen, soldiers of fortune,
adventurers, opportunists, and, of course, the occasional cast-off, rogue,
ruffian, and scoundrel.
Hagedorn, like many of her predecessors, struggles for objectivity,
but makes no effort to hide her frustrations. Still, Invisible Soldiers fills a
niche in that its publication follows the peaks and the drawdowns of the
Bush and Obama administrations’ deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan,
in which contractors (of all types) outnumbered uniformed servicemembers, in both service and, at times, sacrifice. Accordingly, Invisible
Soldiers offers a more complete retrospective on the proliferation of
arms bearing contractors in contingency environments peppered with a
healthy dose of skepticism for the future.

Book Reviews: Security & Defense

153

A gifted story teller, Hagedorn displays the journalistic skills and
instincts she honed at the Wall Street Journal by introducing her book
with a lengthy, engaging, and compelling, but, ultimately irrelevant,
anecdote. To be fair, Hagedorn deserves credit for leading with the
unique and poignant tragedy of Kadhim Alkanni, rather than resorting
to Blackwater’s Nissour Square debacle, now destined to occupy, for
Iraq, the inflammatory space that the 1968 My Lai Massacre carved out
in Vietnam. (That said, Nissour Square receives fully adequate coverage
in Hagedorn’s book.) Other critical, and admittedly colorful, players—
Tim Spicer of Sandline and Aegis, Blackwater founder Erik Prince,
and Doug Brooks, who for many years was the burgeoning security
industry’s organizing and sophisticated voice—feature prominently. Yet
serious policy readers and military historians might be more interested in
analyzing the policy role of Gary J. Motesk—DoD’s point person—on
outsourcing of military and security functions, who somehow escaped
mention in this volume.
Ultimately, Hagedorn recognizes the military had little control over
the policy vacuum that led to the swift and dramatic dilution of the
government’s traditional monopoly over the use of force. Rather than
resulting from a careful, reasoned, and voluntary delegation of authority
to the private sector in conformance with global trends, the US government’s outsourcing of military and security functions was necessitated
by politically popular but empirically unjustified Congressional troop
caps, requiring non-DoD actors to rely on arms bearing contractors
for, among other things, personal security in a hostile environment.
(138) “How else could the nation have engaged in two wars—Iraq and
Afghanistan—simultaneously without reinstituting the draft?” (160).
The poster child anecdote was the State Department’s reliance on its
Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract—originally a centrally
managed source for private security at embassies—which morphed
as the population of diplomats and related officials, employees, and
support staff multiplied in Iraq. Meanwhile, scores of security firms
from around the world entered the region under commercial subcontracts with the unprecedented number of contractors supporting every
conceivable aspect of the Defense, State, and Agency for International
Development departments’ missions in the region. References to the
eclectic and incendiary Star Wars cantina scenes frequently prompted
knowing head nods in conferences discussing the private security proliferation phenomenon.
Hagedorn appears to overstate the policy debate between proponents “who firmly believe...in the importance of the private military
contractors and ha(ve) no intention of regulating them” (101) and opponents of the government’s reliance on private security in contingency
operations. No doubt, her clear abolitionist preference is tempered by
her recognition the outsourcing train left the station long ago. The realists, or, if you prefer, cynics, realize—for the foreseeable future—the
heart of the matter lies in government regulation and management, not
the esoteric aspiration of elimination, of private security.
Here, Hagedorn’s extensive notes and index demonstrate she took her
homework seriously. As a late comer to the literature, Invisible Soldiers
is able to introduce readers to the Montreaux initiative, an important
and laudable global coalition aspiring to bring regulatory order to this
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rapidly evolving and chaotic industry. Closer to home, Hagedorn’s
frustration with the US government’s lackadaisical management of the
industry is palpable: “The British, including journalists, human rights
advocates, politicians, military experts, and private security executives,
began sorting out the issues of private military companies years before
the Americans.” (255) Hagedorn also remains justifiably skeptical of
industry self-regulation. Alas, she fares no better than her colleagues in
suggesting practical, concrete alternatives.
Hagedorn’s perspective and insights on arms bearing contractors,
democracies, and empires—intensely personal, yet thoughtfully cognizant of policy, political theory, and philosophy—should interest readers
new to the field, as well as those well versed in the issues. Outsourcing
the use of force is sufficiently important to the future of democratic
states that this book—as well as the growing corpus of literature it adds
to—merits serious contemplation.
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Organizational Change & Adaptation
Military Adaptation in Afghanistan
Edited by Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell
Reviewed by Chad C. Serena, Political Scientist, RAND Corporation, Pittsburgh,
PA

T

his edited volume provides a timely, detailed, and meticulously
researched set of case studies examining the process of military
adaptation in Afghanistan. While the subject of military adaptation can be
complex and often difficult to frame and describe in a way that resonates
with readers, especially those who may not be intimately familiar with the
subject, the authors of this volume manage to simplify and explain how
military adaptation occurred during the Afghan campaign; and they do
so across a range of cases, and within the context of the political, strategic, operational, and tactical pressures many of the participants faced.
Military Adaptation in Afghanistan is a must read for anyone interested in
learning more about the process of military adaptation in general. But its
particular value lies in its examination of military adaptation through the
lens of the ongoing Afghan campaign.
The editors, Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell,
brought together scholars with varied backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives to evaluate how participating military forces have adapted their
strategies, operations, tactics, and organizations, variously, throughout
(and in one chapter, prior to) the course of the war in Afghanistan. The
12 chapters are written by an expert or group of experts well respected
for their knowledge of the case (or cases) they examine: Farrell opens
the volume by introducing the concept of military adaptation and the
analytic framework the editors developed for the book; Daniel Moran
discusses previous British and Soviet campaigns in Afghanistan; Russell
examines the US experience since the invasion in 2001; Sten Rynning
tackles coalition innovation and adaptation in ISAF and NATO; Farrell
also provides a chapter on the British military in Helmand province
(2006-2011); Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen explores an often overlooked but
interesting and valuable case in his review of the Danish experience
in Helmand; Martijn Kitzen, Sebastiaan Rietjens, and Osinga explain
the Netherlands’ adaptation in Uruzgan; Thomas Rid and Martin Zapfe
take up Germany’s participation in the alliance and the challenges it
faced in deploying to an area of active conflict; Stephen M. Saideman
provides an essay on Canadian adaptation; Antonio Giustozzi covers a
ten-year period of Taliban adaptation; and, Adam Grissom has a chapter
covering the development and adaptation of the Afghan National Army
(ANA) that details the struggles it still faces as ISAF and NATO forces
prepare to leave the country. Osinga and Russell conclude the book with
a review of the lessons of military adaptation highlighted by each author.
How the editors define military adaptation—change to strategy,
force generation, and/or military plans and operations, undertaken in
response to operational challenges and campaign pressures—helps
to align the authors’ case study examinations at the appropriate level.
This broad framework provides conceptual and analytical continuity
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throughout the book, but still gives the authors the flexibility to explore
the details and nuances of each case examined. While military adaptation
is the central theme of the volume and coheres each of the chapters, the
authors’ vantage points and the details of each case tell individualized
stories of how adaptation transpired in Afghanistan, from a variety of
angles and perspectives. Each chapter explores the different challenges
and motivations for military adaptation the participants in the Afghan
campaign faced, and continue to experience as the campaign winds
down. This examination includes adaptive successes and failures and
the various factors that aid, compel, or slow military adaptation, such
as: pressures brought to bear by alliance politics and domestic opinion;
political, economic, and budgetary factors; risk avoidance and aversion;
technology and field innovation; and, changes in adversary behavior,
provincial and local governance, and other important environmental
factors.
Put simply, the story of military operations in Afghanistan is a
story of adaptation and this work comprehensively captures how this
process unfolded over the past decade-plus of operations. It is highly
recommended reading for senior and mid-level officers, policy-makers,
scholars, historians, and practitioners interested in the Afghan campaign
generally and the process of military adaptation during this campaign
specifically. No chapter disappoints, as each is well written and cogent,
and provides lessons of significant value for possible future campaigns.

Gender, Military Effectiveness, and Organizational Change:
The Swedish Model
By Robert Egnell with Petter Hojem and Hannes Berts
Reviewed by Ellen Haring, Colonel (USA Retired)

D
New York: Palgrave
Macmillan 2014
200 pages
$95.00

espite annual rankings placing Sweden at the top of the UN’s list
of most gender-integrated countries in the world, their military
remains strongly resistant to the complete integration of women. A 1980
Swedish Equality Act opened all military occupations and positions to
women. Today, Swedish women serve in all combat and combat support
specialties and have done so for more than 20 years. While the military has
officially opened its doors to women, they serve as a fractional minority
and in almost no senior decision making positions. Sweden, acknowledging that the military has not met integration aspirations, is now tackling
gender equality in its most resistant organization: their Armed Forces.
Dr. Robert Egnell’s book is an effort to capture and chronicle
Sweden’s innovative and evolving approaches to organizational change
within the Swedish Armed Forces. Accepting and embracing the goals
established in 2000 and 2008 by UN Security Council Resolutions 1325
and 1820, which advanced the requirement for women to be included
as full partners in peace and security operations, Sweden moved aggressively to create a culture that integrates a “gender perspective” in all
areas of military activities. Egnell notes that Sweden’s effort is a work in
progress but many emerging insights merit consideration by US policy
makers.
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One of the most important insights of this book is Sweden’s decision to focus on infusing the organization with a heightened gender
perspective (a way of assessing gender-based differences of women and
men as reflected in their social roles and interaction, the relative distribution of power and their access to resources). This gender perspective is
intended to be broad based, looking both internally (at the institution
itself) and externally (at operational effectiveness).
Early debates considered whether the approach should be about
“what is the right thing to do” or “what is the smart thing to do.” Settling
on the latter has provided a focus on military effectiveness rather than
issues of equality. This focus changed the approach where developing a
gender perspective came from personnel and administrative offices to
where it is embedded in operations offices at every level.
In order to provide necessary training, Sweden—in partnership with
Norway and Finland—established the first of its kind, “Nordic Center
for Gender in Military Operations,” located just outside Stockholm. The
center trains leaders at every level in aspects of developing gender awareness. It compiles lessons learned, conducts evaluations and engages in
research relative to gender informed military operations. Some of the
center’s research has led to changes in military operations. One example
of important lessons yielded by their research is military efforts that
dip into the development arena relative to women have not only failed
to provide the expected outcomes (winning hearts and minds, gaining
information, and providing better security) but, in many cases, have
been counterproductive to the activities of those agencies that are tasked
with, and better equipped to perform, development projects.
This is a necessary book for a number of groups within the US
military. First, it is enormously informative for those who are currently
working on integrating women into previously closed combat specialties. It highlights expected sources of resistance and offers strategies
for overcoming resistance. It is important reading for the entire special
operations community, specifically the civil affairs career field. Numerous
sections highlight the relative importance of including gender perspectives when interacting with locals during military operations. Finally,
those charged with professional military education curriculum development and delivery should read this text because, as Egnell asserts, if
you do not teach it within your professional schools than it will not be
viewed as important. And, the school house is the most important place
to begin to effect organizational change.
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War & History
Blowtorch: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and American Cold War
Strategy
By Frank Leith Jones
Reviewed by Ingo Trauschweizer, Ohio University

F
Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2013
416 pages
$52.95

rank Leith Jones, a professor of security studies at the US Army
War College and former senior defense department official, presents a biography of Robert Komer that doubles as an insightful study
of American Cold War strategy and policy. Following Paul Kennedy,
Jones approaches his subject as a history from the middle, and Komer
offers an excellent case study of a mostly forgotten official at the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, and the White House who was one of
the architects of Cold War strategy in the 1960s and 1970s. We tend to
remember Komer for his role in running the “other war” in Vietnam from
1966-68. Jones, too, places Komer’s thinking about social, economic, and
military approaches to pacification and counterinsurgency in Vietnam at
the heart of his study, but he reminds us of Komer’s role in assessing the
Soviet threat, his influence on policies toward Third World countries in
the 1960s, and his position in Harold Brown’s defense department during
the Carter administration, where Komer defined policy for strengthening
the NATO alliance and helped translate the Carter doctrine into military
strategy for the Persian Gulf and the greater Middle East.
Throughout three decades in government service, Komer remained
a realist, consistently arguing for multilateral approaches to international
security, and he developed a keen sense for the importance of Third
World actors. By the 1960s, as Komer gained the trust and confidence
of presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, he emerged as
a successor to George F. Kennan—a leading strategic thinker for the
global Cold War. Unlike Kennan, Komer was a pragmatist who played
a central role in translating strategic thought into policy for particular
crises and wars (on the Indian subcontinent, in Indonesia, in Yemen,
and eventually in Vietnam). Jones’s Komer is a Clausewitzian, with a
firm grasp of the national interest and the need to align means, ends,
and political objectives. But despite Komer’s best efforts in Washington
and Vietnam—which led to a remarkably well-integrated civilian presence in the war effort under General William Westmoreland, though it
suffered later from the tense relationship between the abrasive Komer
and General Creighton Abrams—improved structures for counterinsurgency operations did not yield victory.
How did Komer rise to a position of great influence and where
did he form his worldview? Like Kennan, Komer was as an outsider, a
Midwesterner by way of Harvard University, where he studied with the
historian William Langer, discovered Clausewitz, and concluded from
his thesis on British strategy in World War I that, in modern war, civilian
leaders were the better strategists. Komer served as a combat historian
with US Fifth Army in Italy, which gave him insight into civil-military
relations in the occupation of liberated areas. Langer and Komer met
again in November 1950 at the CIA’s Office of National Estimates. Under
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the tutelage of Langer and Sherman Kent, Komer became an expert in
South Asian and Middle Eastern affairs and he closely observed the
process of formulating national security policy from intelligence data.
After a year at the National War College, Komer returned to the CIA
as head of the Soviet estimates group and in 1958 he was appointed
liaison to the National Security Council. Throughout the 1950s, Komer
developed a finely tuned sense that national interests, not ideology or
encrusted structures, should determine the framework for strategy and
policy. Contrary to prevailing attitudes, he concluded that neutrality in
the Cold War was not in itself an anti-Western position. When McGeorge
Bundy reorganized the NSC staff, Komer seized the moment and made
himself indispensible in carefully crafted responses to crises in Yemen,
Indonesia, and India. This placed him in the inner circle of advisers in
Lyndon Johnson’s White House, which in turn allowed him to shape
counterinsurgency approaches during the Vietnam War.
In the Carter administration, Komer found new champions and he
returned as a policymaker and strategist with a strong commitment to
strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Komer’s policy
proposals again were defined by realism and multilateralism. Building
on his policies in the late 1970s, Komer, never one to shy away from a
fight, offered sharp public opposition to John Lehman and the maritime
strategy of the Reagan administration. This points at another Robert
Komer, who emerges from Jones’s skillful narrative: an historian and
analyst of what went wrong in Vietnam. Komer’s experience highlights
the difficult relationship of civilian and military officers in a war that
was never winnable by one group alone. In his studies for the RAND
Corporation, Komer exposed the tensions between different agencies
within the American bureaucracy.
Policymakers and strategists faced with meeting today’s threats
could benefit from reading Komer’s Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional
Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam (1972) and Bureaucracy at
War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (1986). Jones’s appreciation
for Komer’s thinking and the meticulous evidence he draws from government records and Komer’s memoranda, blunt press briefings, and
post-war studies illustrate the complexity of the Vietnam War and the
global Cold War in ways that should prove critical to understanding
the pitfalls inherent in any bureaucracy and the challenges faced by a
superpower with global commitments, conventional rivals, and irregular
enemies. Blowtorch deserves a wide readership; anyone interested in global
strategy, the Vietnam War, the Cold War in the 1960s, or institutional
history should find it enlightening.

Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive
By Rhys Crawley
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, PhD, Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College.
It has now been over one hundred years since the First World War
broke out, and April 2015 is the hundredth anniversary of the beginning
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of the Gallipoli campaign. In this timely consideration, Rhys Crawley’s
Climax at Gallipoli provides an important revisionist account of that
campaign’s August 1915 final offensive by the British-led Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force (MEF). Crawley maintains the August offensive
never really had a chance of defeating Ottoman forces due to deeply
flawed planning, a lack of necessary resources, and other important
factors. He calls the campaign an utter failure rather than the brink of
victory it has been described as by historians elsewhere. Unsurprisingly,
he also disagrees with key allied leaders, including MEF commander
General Ian Hamilton, who portrayed the August offensive as a “very
near” success (8). Consequently, Crawley’s analysis goes against a
deeply-rooted historical narrative, which he has challenged through a
meticulous command of the facts in this very fine-grained analysis.
Most senior British officers at Gallipoli had fought in the Boer War
and learned lessons in South Africa that were badly outdated by World
War I. As on the Western Front, most senior MEF officers had also been
taught to accept the primacy of the offensive, and did not fully realize how
new technology added to the advantages enjoyed by a defending force.
While recognizing the bravery of the Ottoman troops, senior MEF officers considered them to be especially vulnerable to offensively-oriented
movement involving surprise, deception, and speed. In a chauvinistic
flourish on this mindset, General Hamilton characterized British troops
as “superior individuals” who “are animated with a superior ideal,” and
would ultimately prevail in any conflict with the Ottomans in which they
led (67). Banal statements of national superiority seldom help military
planning and may have partially caused the MEF leadership to overlook
problems with many of their sick, exhausted, and inexperienced troops.
These soldiers had been worn down by constant work, lack of sleep, and
woefully inadequate medical care. Crawley maintains this force was not
capable of prolonged action, but it was nevertheless required to assault
well-prepared defenders in mountainous terrain that did not lend itself
to mobility or coordinated forward movement.
Further complicating MEF problems, planners made a number
of assumptions about Ottoman forces that were incorrect. In particular, British military leaders considered the Ottoman army to be
weak, demoralized, and likely to crumble. General Hamilton stated
the Ottomans favored trench warfare because “their stupid men have
only simple straightforward duties to perform” (24). In this command
climate, it is not surprising military intelligence repeatedly underestimated the Ottomans. Despite allied estimates to the contrary, Ottoman
forces were not suffering massive health problems, morale was generally
high, and many of these troops were prepared to die defending every
inch of contested ground. Beyond miscalculations about the enemy, the
MEF had huge gaps in its information about the terrain since ground
reconnaissance was limited by forces encircling the beachheads. Making
matters worse, MEF maps did not adequately depict problems with the
terrain, and units became lost at crucial points in the campaign. One unit
assigned to capture “Hill 10” in the August offensive seized a defended
sand dune instead and then came under fire from the real Hill 10.
Crawley also makes a strong case the level of artillery support for
the August offensive was inadequate, with erratic shooting and an insufficient volume of fire. Many of the guns provided for this campaign were
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obsolete, and others were worn out. There were also a limited number
of suitable sites for gun positions under MEF control and less ammunition available than on the Western front. Crawley notes the artillery
had mostly shrapnel shells, which had limited value against sheltered
defensive positions. Ominously, there was a severe shortage of high
explosive shells, which could have been much more useful. Other problems included failures in artillery spotting due to the confusing terrain
and bad maps. MEF aerial observation occurred at Gallipoli but was still
in its early stages and coordination with the ground forces was extremely
difficult. Conversely, the Ottoman side had a strong knowledge of the
terrain and more accurate maps, which enabled the defenders to apply
effective artillery fire. Ottoman guns frequently changed position, and
many allied spotters were misled by dummy flashes and decoy smoke.
Fleet guns used to support the offensive were fired at such a low trajectory they were of limited value against forces emplaced on, or behind,
high ground. Additionally, the danger of German submarines deeply
complicated naval fire support by limiting the areas from which the fleet
could operate.
Some of the worst nightmares of Gallipoli involved logistics.
Logistics in this environment had none of the advantages of the Western
Front where strong road and rail networks were in place to support
the movement of materials to the front lines. Unlike British forces in
Europe, everything the MEF needed had to be sent by sea, mostly from
3,500 miles away. Supply ships had to travel through submarine infested
waters with numerous stops, including those to repack cargo so vital
supplies could be unpacked first. In most instances, it took five to six
weeks to get the cargo to the troops, and sometimes supplies were not
delivered until after they were no longer required. The supply system
therefore worked very poorly, although there was never a complete
breakdown.
Crawley notes many other problems with the campaign, but they
are too numerous to examine in this review. Suffice to say the comprehensive and detailed nature of Crawley’s analysis makes a compelling
case about the doomed nature of the August offensive. Crawley’s final
evaluation of the MEF effort is it made some minor tactical gains during
the August offensive, but these did not matter in the ultimate disposition
of the battle. This study is clearly a useful addition to the growing body
of revisionist literature (including Robin Prior’s 2009 study Gallipoli: The
End of the Myth) helping to inform debate and perhaps alter historical
understanding of this campaign. Crawley’s highly analytical and academic approach makes his case well but may also be less interesting for
those interested in the human drama associated with Gallipoli.

The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Diplomacy, Legacy
Edited by Asaf Siniver
Reviewed by William F. Owen, Editor of Infinity Journal

T

his book is a collection of essays on the very subject of the title. As
such, there is very little – if any – discussion of the military aspects
of the October War of 1973. The book essentially seeks to present a new

Oxford: Oxford University
Press 2013
331 pages
$35.00

162

Parameters 44(3) Autumn 2014

dimension to the war by focussing on its diplomatic, political and cultural
aspects, and in this regard it both succeeds and fails.
Problems always occur when attempting to understand the history
of the 1973 war, even the Israel Defense Force (IDF) has yet to produce
a definitive and agreed upon version of events (only it has any real access
to the data), leaves the current military histories of the 1973 war rather
lacking in all but the most obvious and widely agreed detail. The other
aspect often forgotten is the history of this war is sometimes hostage to
the political opinions of the authors. This book seems to take quite a
left-wing view of events. However, that should not discourage readers
from making an objective assessment of the views the book presents.
The book spans the incredible breadth of the subject matter, and
even if some of the conjectures and facts are perhaps too colored by
political opinion, it is a valuable addition to the library of anyone studying the 1973 war.
This problem does not obscure the need to assess some of the book’s
contentions. Two of the chapters on the cultural and social memory
and/or narrative of the war seem out of place in the book, and lack
any sound military understanding or perspective. For example, current
scholarship is beginning to reveal the IDF was not as un-prepared as
most have come to believe. Firstly, the IDF was largely configured to
meet a surprise attack, but the problem was not everyone understood the
plan, or when the attack came it was not a raid or incursion, but a fullyfledged theatre offensive attempting to destroy Israeli formations and
take ground. Thus, to claim the surprise and violence of the Egyptian
and Syrian attacks created “shock” misses the point; the war ended with
Syria’s almost complete defeat, and Israeli forces within Egypt able to
threaten Cairo. Ultimately, the surprise failed.
Whatever anyone wishes to assert as Sadat’s motivation for the war,
he did not foresee the outcome being a demilitarized Sinai gained at
enormous cost or a peace treaty with Israel that would ultimately claim
his life and spark a border war with Libya in 1977. Asserting Israeli
society was somehow shaped and effected by the “shock of 73” is an
overstatement. The war of 1948 claimed a far higher percentage of the
Israeli population killed, wounded, and displaced, than any war before
or since. The presumed long-term effect of the 1973 war seems pretty
pale compared to the social impact of the 1982 Lebanon War and the
two major Palestinian rebellions that followed.
It would be safe to say there are strong chapters written by experts
comfortable with their subject matter, and there are chapters were the
authors are on far less solid ground. Ultimately, the biggest problem this
book has to contend with is the very nature of the subject in terms of
trying to write about the 1973 war without any solid grounding in the
military history, or in some cases understanding the extant nature of the
debate amongst other Israeli and military history scholars.
Overall, this is not a book for the uninformed. It tends to present
views that could easily be countered by different perspectives. As an
attempt to try and ring fence the political, diplomatic and social or cultural aspects of the 1973 war away from the actual military conduct,
the work fails since a reader familiar with the military conduct of war
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would quickly sense there was perhaps some lack of understanding. For
example, the book’s chapter on Jordanian participation (or not) in the
war entirely fails to mention that, on the 7th of October, Israeli brigades
reinforcing the Golan had been moved from the Jordan Valley, and performed that move under the direct observation of the Jordanian Army.
This fact is clearly significant and highlights the dangers of attempting
to divorce the political and diplomatic understanding of the conflict
from the military. In contrast most military histories of the 1973 war
deal adequately with the diplomatic and political dimensions.
Someone already comfortable and well acquainted with the 1973
war will find this book as a valuable source of information and interpretation on some of the conflict’s diplomatic aspects, but should not be
regarded as the authoritative source on the subject.

Law and War
Edited by Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas and Martha Merrill
Umphrey
Reviewed by Sibylle Scheipers, Lecturer in International Relations at the
University of St. Andrews and a Senior Research Associate at Oxford
University’s Changing Character of War Programe.

T

he introduction to Law and War opens with a brief discussion of
the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen and suspected
al-Qaeda member, who was killed on 30 September 2011 by a CIA-led
Predator drone strike in Yemen. It references central figures involved
in the debate over the Bush administration’s approach to the law of
armed conflict, such as Benjamin Wittes and Harold Koh. It is hence not
implausible for the reader to assume this edited volume sets out to reassess the relationship between war and law thirteen years into the so-called
“War on Terror,” as major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
have drawn to a close. However, this is not the case or, rather, if this was
the aim, the book failed to achieve it.
The introduction is followed by five chapters on a variety of topics
ranging from biological warfare to war crimes trials. The quality of the
individual chapters differs, which is to a certain extent inevitable in
an edited volume. A number of chapters, most notably Sarah Sewall’s
chapter on the limits of law, Gabriella Blum’s chapter on the individualization of war and Laura K. Donohue’s chapter on pandemic disease and
biological warfare, reiterate the basic tenets of the globalization narrative, according to which globalization has led to a rise in the participation
of so-called “non-state actors” in armed conflict, which in turn will
undermine the law of armed conflict. This view, though oft repeated, is
deeply problematic, as it mistakes the exclusionary mechanisms that are
internal to the law of armed for external limitations of its applicability.1
The edited volume is further marred by a number of manifest misrepresentations of authors such as Carl Schmitt: both the introduction
1      See also Sibylle Scheipers, “Irregular Fighters: Is the Law of Armed Conflict Outdated?”
Parameters 43/4 (2013), 45-56
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and Blum’s chapter seem to imply that for Schmitt legal constraints on
warfare are irrelevant (7, 55), ostensibly deriving this conclusion from
Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political and his Political Theolog y, but failing
to take into account Schmitt’s emphasis on the importance of the law of
armed conflict for restraining warfare in the Nomos of the Earth. Sewall
includes a largely misleading reference to an article by Adam Roberts
on civilian casualties in her chapter (26, note 6) and, when discussing
reciprocity in “asymmetric conflicts,” does not consider pertinent recent
studies on the concept, such as Mark Osiel’s seminal book The End of
Reciprocity.
Samuel Moyn’s chapter on Vietnam and the “War on Terror” is
quite interesting and innovative. Moyn makes the case that despite largescale violations of the law of armed conflict, public criticism regarding
the US intervention in Vietnam focused on jus ad bellum issues, whereas
the critical debate on the “War on Terror” has largely seized upon jus
in bello issues. Yet, Moyn’s chapter remains largely US-centric (it would
have been appropriate to note that the debate on the Iraq war in the
United Kingdom focused on jus ad bellum issues and jus in bello questions remained secondary in importance throughout the war). More
importantly, although Moyn presents his chapter as a comparative perspective, his contribution focuses almost exclusively on Vietnam and
does not discuss the debate over violations of the law of armed conflict
in the “War on Terror.”
Larry May’s chapter on war crimes trials includes some substantial
arguments, although it gets off to a weak start by drawing extensively
on Hugo Grotius to support the argument. However, the sections on
Grotius are not sufficiently compelling; and the reader is left to wonder
whether the chapter had not been stronger without those sections. May’s
subsequent discussion on war crimes trials misses some central considerations such as the impact of criminal prosecutions of leadership
figures on the peace process.
On the whole, the chapters are not coming together to make a sufficiently strong contribution to the larger debate. For instance, Blum’s
and May’s perspectives on war crimes trials differ substantially, but this
difference is nowhere explicitly discussed. The introduction remains too
much at the surface to give the rest of the chapters the required level of
coherence. The volume also shows that more editorial work would have
been needed: Donohue’s chapter, though interesting in substance, is 40
pages long, followed by 30 (!) pages of notes and references. But the most
disappointing flaw of the edited volume is that issues such as torture in
the “War on Terror” and the practice of targeted killing remain the
proverbial elephant in the room throughout the book. These are the
most problematic areas of the law of armed conflict today; yet, none
of the chapters devotes any substantial thought to them. Instead, the
book largely rehearses debates that are familiar from the late 1990s. This
is particularly puzzling and disappointing given that most contributors
are renowned scholars in this field. It would appear that despite all the
public furor over violations of the law of armed conflict in the “War on
Terror,” the academic debate, at least to the extent that it is reflected in
this book, has still some way to go.

